General Musa Khan

General Musa Khan was born 20 october 1908 in quetta.
He was the eldest son of Sardar Yazdan Khan.
he was from the Sardar family of the Hazara tribe in Balochistan,
Pakistan He was a Naik (Junior Non-Commissioned Officer) in the
106th Hazara Pioneers and went to the Indian Military Academy
in Dehra Dun as a cadet and graduated with the first batch of the
British Indian commissioned officers on 1 February 1935.
He was posted to the 6th Royal Battalion,the 13th Frontier
Force Rifles as a Platoon Commander in 1936. He took part
in the Waziristan Operations in 1936-1938 and in World War II,
where he served in North Africa. He served with distinction
in the Pakistani Army and rose to the rank of the commander
in chief of Pakistan Armed Forces during President Mohammad
Ayub Khan’s regime (1958–1969). His promotion to commander-in-chief
saw suppression of two seniors: Maj Gen Sher Ali Khan and
Maj Gen Latif Khan, both Sandhurst graduates of 1933.[1]
After Gen. Musa retired from the army, President Ayub Khan
appointed him as the Governor of West Pakistan from 1967 to
1969. After serving for a few years, he retired and settled
in Karachi. In 1987, he was once again involved in politics.
He was appointed Governor of Balochistan Province by the then
President General Zia-ul-Haq. In Balochistan, Governor; General
(Retd) Musa dissolved the provincial assembly in December 1988.
However, the Balochistan High Court restored the assembly amid
public condemnation of Governor's move. The step towards dissolving
the assembly was believed to have been taken with the consent of
the President and Prime Minister.
General Mohammed Musa commanded the Army in the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1965, and had overall responsibility for operations throughout
the conflict. As Army Chief, he was criticised for not anticipating
an assault across the international border. However he was given
credit for blunting the Indian offensive towards Sialkot during the
Battle of Chawinda. He has narrated the events and experiences of
the war in his book "My Version". In the book he has given accounts
of the secret war that was going on in Kashmir between the two
countries, long before the real war actual began.
General Musa Khan is the author of his autobiography,
Jawan to General in which he describes his lifetime experiences
from a simple foot-soldier rising to become a general.
Musa Khan was the Chief of Army Staff, Pakistan; he succeeded
Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who was then President.He was the
oldest son of Sardar Yazdan Khan. He was a Naik (junior officer)
in Hazara Pioneers and went to the Indian Military Academy
in Dehra Dun as a cadet and graduated with the first batch
of the Indian commissioned officers. He was posted to the
6th Royal Battalion,the 13th Frontier Force Rifles as a
Platoon Commander in 1936. He took part in the Waziristan
Operations in 1936-1938 and in World War II, where he served
in North Africa. He served with distinction in the Pakistani
Army and became the commander-in-chief (C in C) of Pakistan
Armed Forces during President Mohammad Ayub Khan’s regime (1958–1969).
In the War of 1965, Indian Army attacked West Pakistan from Lahore border,
with 600 tanks and 5 time bigger force then Pakistan Army,
General Musa Khan defended the country with heart and soul.
The Wahaga battle field became the graveyard of Indian tanks.
After he retired from the army, President Ayub Khan appointed
him as Governor of West Pakistan (1967–1969) and after serving
for a few years, he retired and settled in Karachi. In 1987,
he was appointed as Governor of Balochistan Province by
President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. In Balochistan, Governor (Retd)
General Mohammad Musa dissolved the assembly in December 1988.
However, the Balochistan High Court restored the assembly amid
public condemnation of Governor's move that was believed to be
taken with the consent of the President and Prime Minister.
1965 WAR:-
General Mohammed Musa, who commanded the Army in the 65 War,
gave his account of how the Indians surprised the GHQ, the
C-in-C and the Supreme Commander Field Marshal Ayub Khan on
September 6, 1965. Narrates Musa Khan in his book "My Version":
India launched her ignominious, undeclared and blatant aggression
on our homeland at about 0330 hours on 6 September.
The Supreme Commander was informed about the invasion
by Air Commander Akhtar of the Pakistan Air Force, who
was on duty at the Air Defence Headquarters at Rawalpindi
on night of 5-6 September. Indian troop movements cross
the frontier had been reported to him by the border posts
of the PAF Wireless Observer wing. The President then rang
me up to ascertain whether or not GHQ had received any
information about the Indian attack and the hereabouts
of the field army that morning.
Lt. General Musa describes the genesis of the surprise
Indian attack on 6 September in his own words:
The then Foreign Minister Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and
the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed spurred on by Major
General Akhtar Hussain Malik, who was commander of our
troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take
advantage of the disturbed situation in the valley and
direct the Army to send raiders into Indian held Kashmir
for conducting guerrilla activities there and to help,
on a long term basis, the locals in organising a movement
with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.
Continues the former C-in-C in his book, the sponsors and
supporters of the raids had at last succeeded in persuading
the President to take the plunge that led to an all-out
armed conflict with India' .......
The concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held Kashmir,
code named Gibraltar was the brain-child of the ministry of
Foreign Affairs but General Musa assumed full responsibility
for the development of the concept, its planning and coordination
of the entire operation. He says:
after the Government finally decided that deep raids should be
launched in Indian-held Kashmir, I directed Commander 12 Division,
Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, to prepare a draft plan for
the operation, code-named 'Gibraltar' in consultation with GHQ
and within the broad concept we had specified. GHQ approved it
after making certain changes in it. With the help of sand model,
he went over the final plan in Murree before it was put into
effect on 7 August 1965 under our overall control. The Supreme
Commander and his Military Secretary were present. He also agreed
with it. I was accompanied by the CGS (Major General Sher Bahadur)
and the Directors of Military Operations and Intelligence Brigadier
Gul Hasan and Irshad Ahmed Khan respectively. No civil official
attended this briefing.
Broadly the plan envisaged, on a short-term basis, sabotage of
military targets, disruptions of communications, etc. and, as a
long-term measure, distribution of arms to the people of occupied
Kashmir and initiation of a guerrilla movement there with a view
to starting an uprising in the valley eventually. The push towards
Akhnur was not part of it. However, it was considered as one of the
likely operations that we might have to undertake, as we felt our
activities would have an escalating effect.
Nevertheless, when the Indians started attacking and capturing
Azad Kashmir territory in Tithwal and Haji Pir Pass areas,
we decided to hold them in these places and retaliate by threatening
Akhnur through the Chamb valley in order to release the pressure in the north.
The simple truth emerging from the preceding statement of
General Musa is clear in that, while the concept of 'Gibraltar'
did originate from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Musa,
whatever he might say after the event, went along with it in a half
heartedly and non serious manner leading to the downfall of
President of Pakistan General Ayub Khan via Tashkent Agreement.
The loser in the final analysis was Pakistan, described so feelingly
by General K.M. Arif in an analysis carried by "Daily Dawn", 6 September 1990.
How and why Pakistan blundered into war .......... At that time,
the policy making in the country was highly personalised. The
institutions were weak and by-passed. Pakistan's Foreign Office
with Mr. Aziz Ahmed as the Foreign Secretary and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto
as the Foreign Minister called the martial tunes. It had miscalculated
that despite operation Gibraltar, the fighting was likely to remain
confined inside the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
The Foreign Office is on record to have assessed that India
was not in a position to risk a general war with Pakistan......for
inexplicable reasons the General Headquarters based its operational
plan in Kashmir on a wishful logic. The misplaced ego, the high
ambition and the naive approach of a selected few , plunged Pakistan
into an armed conflict. The outcome of the war, or the lack of it,
eclipsed Ayub Khan's position.
At a briefing arranged at SSG Parachute Training School at Peshawar
in the presence of two senior officers, Lt. Col. Abdul Matin, the
Commander of No. 1 Commando Battalion, now retired and the brilliant
Operations Staff Officer Maj. E. H. Dar, (Late Major General E. H. Dar)
the Air Force Chief was told that only a pre-emptive operation like
the Israeli crippling raids against the front line Arab State's air
bases as in 1956 Arab-Israel War, could have probability of success.
To this, the Air Chief observed that a decision to carry out pre-emptive
operation as suggested could only be taken by the Government
(meaning President Ayub Khan). Technically the observation made was
correct but in that case the operation should have been based on
the hypothesis of pre-emptive alone. There was also objection by the
Military Operations Experts to the dropping of Para commandoes in
Kashmir with no equivalent of French Maquis to hide, feed and
organise their escape and was tantamount to suicide.
General Musa Khan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan's C-in-C, was the
archetype of the loyal commander. But after him Ayub appointed
another favorite, Yahya Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto set up a
' Liberation Cell ', which included people like:
Mr Aziz Ahmed
Mr Nazir Ahmed
Mr Ayub Buksh Awan
Mr NA Farooqi
Mr Ahmed
Mr Altaf Goher (although the latter did not attend any of the meetings)
General Musa, Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army at that time,
confirms the existence of this 'Cell', which was set up in August 1964.
The majority of the members of this 'Cell'
were from the 'Qadiani sect’, he pointed out.
When this ambitious plan was first sent to the GHQ, General Musa
opposed it and wrote the following points to the President Ayub Khan:
Guerrilla war in Kashmir can only be successful if the people
of Kashmir take part in it, and in my opinion we need more
time to prepare people for this.
During the guerrilla war if India realized that it is
losing the war in Kashmir, she will attack Pakistan.
As long as Pakistan is not in a position to defeat India
militarily, we should not venture such operation in Kashmir.
In order to defeat India we need more army, better arms
and better training.
General Musa asked for money to set up two more army divisions
 to face the challenge. General Ayub in principle agreed
with this idea, but the Finance Minister Mr Shoaib persuaded
him against this by saying that the Pakistan economy cannot
afford it. And this idea was dropped. It is ironic that no
such army was raised before the start of the ‘Operation Gibraltar’
or during its operations, but after the war, in the same month,
two divisions were set up.
According to Brigadier (R) Farooq, General Musa was a simple man.
He gave his opinion about the 'Operation' and then did not make
it a matter of pride and remained quiet. if he and General Sher Bahadur
who also opposed the idea, had resigned then there would have
been no 'Operation Gibraltar'.
A top level meeting was held at the Headquarters of the 12th
Division in May 1965. Once again, General Musa opposed the plan,
and to this President Ayub Khan said: "Musa I have been assured
by the Foreign Office that India would not be involved in a full
scale war". When both General Musa and General Sher Bahadur said
that if we are to start a guerrilla war at that level, it is
very likely that India would react and attack Pakistan.
President Ayub Khan reacted by saying: "We will have to
take heart sometime".
Apart from the assurance to which President Ayub Khan made
reference that India would not attack Pakistan, Pakistani
planners of this ‘Operation’ were led to believe that India
is not in a position to launch attack against Pakistan until
1966 or 1967. It was emphasized that we do not waste any
more time, and start our action as soon as possible.
Musa Says in his book, 'My Version' that the Kashmiris of
the Valley were not taken into confidence about the ‘Operation’
that was to be started to liberate them. He wrote:
We had not even consulted the public leaders across the cease
fire line about our aims and intentions, let alone associating
them with our planning for the clandestine war...
The people of the area to be 'liberated' must have to be taken
into confidence, if the people organizing this gigantic task
really meant business. Without the help of the local people
outside army cannot win a war or even survive. Not only the
people of Kashmir living on the other side of the cease fire,
line were not taken into confidence, also the people of Azad Kashmir
even the Azad Kashmir Government was not taken into confidence.
When the ‘Operation’ was put into practice then the planners
realized the need to have some Kashmiri support. They already
had set up a Liberation Council, and compelled by circumstances
they announced that Choudhry Ghullam Abbass was leading this
Liberation Council.
Choudhry Ghulam Abbass was already very annoyed with this,
he immediately rejected that in a news statement in the
Daily Nawa E Waqat the following day:
"I have nothing to do with all this, and I did not know
anything about an 'Operation'."
General Musa confirms the above position, he said:
"Because of the haste with which the ‘Operation’ was
launched, even Azad Kashmir leaders were not taken into
confidence by the advocates of Guerrilla raids. Helplessly
they remained in the background. Their co - operation was
also very necessary and would have been very helpful.
They could have assisted the mujahideen in various ways by themselves."
K. H Khurshid, who was the secretary to Mohammed Ali Jinnah,
and also Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir Government commented:
"I firmly believe that Ayub Khan was not fully aware of the
reasons for the war of 1965. Foreign Office, Home Ministry
and some senior officers from the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
which included A. B Awan, Nazir Ahmed, Aziz Ahmed and
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prevailed on him and assured him that
it is only a small programme which would not lead to a
war with India. Ayub Khan who offered India ‘joint defence’
would not have agreed to a full scale war with India....
These men wanted to weaken Ayub’s hold on the government,
and this is the real reason why he was so angry with them after the war."
Ayub Khan was assured by his advisors and the Foreign Minister,
Z.A. Bhutto, that India would not cross the international
boundary to attack Pakistan. The Indian leaders and ministers
were clearly saying that if Pakistan did not stop its adventure
in Kashmir, then the conflict could spread to other areas.
But Pakistani leaders did not take these threats seriously
until the direct Indian attack on the Pakistani cities of
Lahore and Sialkot in order to release the pressure on
the retreating Indian forces in Kashmir.
planned to topple or weaken Ayub Khan". This has been very
controversial, but whatever its real motives, it resulted
in a full scale war between India and Pakistan.
The Security Council arranged a cease fire on 23 September 1965.
He died on 12 March 1991 in Quetta.